Democratic selections?

Civil society and development in South Africa’s new democracy

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Preface

In the final years of apartheid government, many national, provincial and local forums were formed. These forums enabled parties outside the formal political system, and other elements of civil society, to participate in decision making. They marked the end of unilateral rule and demonstrated the success and effectiveness of many protest actions and strategies.

The introduction of representative democracy in South Africa clearly has implications not only for the role and position of these forums but for the relationship between the State and civil society in general. Some argue that the new political process requires a shift away from a political structure which is based on forums. Elected and mandated representatives are able to support the policies and policy directions they, their parties, and presumably their constituencies deem appropriate. These representatives can ensure that a government stays attuned to the perspectives of civil society.

The contrary view, that forums should continue in the new system, is supported in the RDP White Paper and by key people in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Structures which ensure the participation of organised interests in the decision-making process would essentially be consultative, however, as it is unlikely that participants would have sufficiently clear mandates to justify overruling decisions taken by political structures.

Many analysts and opinion leaders stress that the role of forums should be seen within the context of the political system as a whole. Forums should not be allowed to replace political structures which have clear and legitimate mandates. As Friedman and Reitzes point out, special interests should not be given the unfair advantage of double representation.

Community or sectoral interests may believe that a forum is necessary to streamline development. The State should also be able to establish appropriate communication channels between itself and these interests. The challenge is to ensure that those with an interest in development outcomes are able to participate effectively in shaping these.

In contrast, it is equally important to ensure that forums are not imposed on sectors or communities. Interest groups should be able to interact with government, even if they are not members of these structures. In effective democracies access is not subject to ‘gatekeeping’. Moreover, organisations of civil society should be able to put their cases to government in an open environment. Formal structures, where they exist, should not become obstacles to open interaction.

Ironically, countries where the organogram of state and civil society relations can easily be drawn are often those in which civil society does not really exist or is very weak. Countries marked by many formal ‘participative’ committees at different levels often identify the elements of civil society that suit government interests rather than those that ensure effective interaction between government and civil society.

Capacity building, rather than the creation of more structures, is central to defining an effective role for civil society in development. Civil society has its own structures and an ability to lobby and engage with government on issues of concern. At some levels this has to be achieved through formal democratic mechanisms; at others alternative
innovative institutions may be required. The final test of any mechanism is that it should not result in gatekeeping or introduce unfair power relations.

These considerations prompted the DBSA civil society policy programme to commission the Centre for Policy Studies to prepare a reflective study on the nature of the relationship between civil society and government.

It is hoped that this paper will prove a constructive contribution to the debate on this crucial dimension of democratic and people-centred development.

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The global revival of civil society

Civil society, once regarded as an arcane concept of interest only to political theorists, is enjoying a global revival.

Its renewed popularity must be understood in the context of the collapse of Stalinist states in Eastern Europe and the former USSR; the demise of the one-party state in Africa; and the overburdened welfare states of Western Europe. These developments have led to disillusionment with the state and the emergence of theoretical anti-statism.

In the East, West and South, varieties of capitalist and communist states have failed to meet expectations. The welfare state is increasingly unable to deliver goods and services and is seen as a source of bureaucracy, not emancipation (see, for example, Keane, 1988: 1–30). The growth of anti-democratic statist structures, and the Weberian nightmare of an ever-expanding bureaucracy, characterises modern societies. The state has become increasingly unaccountable and unrepresentative. In the West, liberal democracy is seen by many as an illusion: citizens have little if any say in decisions. In the East, identification of ‘the people’s party’ with the monolithic state and the assumed homogeneous and undifferentiated ‘will of the people’ has been recognised as spurious, and the notion of the morally regulative state discredited.

On the right, these developments prompted a renewed theoretical assault on the postwar consensus in liberal democracies on the need for the welfare state. This has had profound policy consequences: vast areas of social and economic life are being privatised and the socio-economic functions of the state are being curtailed. On the left, grass roots social movements in civil society came to be seen as a more plausible route to popular empowerment than the state. Cohen and Arato note that the renaissance of civil society discourse ‘reveals that collective actors and sympathetic theorists are still oriented by the utopian ideals of modernity; the ideas of basic rights, liberty, equality, democracy, solidarity and justice...[C]ivil society itself has emerged as a new kind of utopia... that includes a range of complementary forms of democracy and a complex set of civil, social, and political rights that must be compatible with the modern differentiation of society’ (1992: xii).

It is in the light of these dynamics that citizens and theorists have come to demonise the state and deify civil society.

Civil society in South Africa

South Africa is no exception: here too, the idea of civil society has fired the imagination of social agents and commentators across the spectrum, and has come to mean all things to all people, different things to different people.

Ideas were influenced by peculiar circumstances, or at least circumstances peculiar to societies experiencing a transition from authoritarian rule (see Schmitter et al, 1986). Since the majority was excluded on racial grounds from representation in the state, resistance organisations were forced to mobilise against the state. As opportunities for legal organisation opened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this mobilisation was led by a network of civic, youth and other
movements which coalesced into the United Democratic Front. The trade union movement, whose renaissance in the 1970s and early 1980s posed the first organised challenge to the white monopoly of power, combined ‘routine’ workplace activity with anti-apartheid mobilisation.

Because these movements mobilised independently of the state, and resembled the social movements which kindled enthusiasm for civil society among the left elsewhere, they inspired a domestic variant of the left ‘civil society’ theory which wielded powerful influence in other parts of the globe. When activists within these movements, or intellectuals sympathetic to them, demanded a greater say in decisions or a share of resources, they did this in the name of ‘civil society’.

The trend was strengthened in South Africa by the fact that apartheid did not simply exclude the majority from representation in the state. It also established subordinate representative institutions — ‘homeland’ legislatures, the tricameral parliament and black local authorities — which claimed to meet black demands for representation but did so on white terms and within parameters determined by an automatic white majority in the central legislature. The (successful) attempt to deprive these institutions of legitimacy and effectiveness became a prime focus of resistance activity; this implied an emphasis on demonstrating that elected authorities were less representative than those formed in ‘civil society’ by ‘the people’\(^1\). In the minds of some in the social movements, the defective representativeness of apartheid local governments, for example, came to illustrate the deficiencies of all local government: it became common to stress that it was ‘not enough’ to extend the franchise to all — it was necessary also to ‘empower the people’ and their vehicle, ‘civil society’.

Two consequences flowed from this in the last years of apartheid. The first was that the demand for the democratisation of the state was not restricted to a call for universal franchise; democracy was held to be incomplete unless civil society was assured a share in decisions. This implied that it needed to be incorporated within the state. The second was that civil society, conceived of as those associations which participated in ‘the struggle’, was held to possess a capacity to change society which state institutions, even representative ones, lack. Civil society is thus burdened with the expectation that it can provide a panacea for many ills; procure development; achieve active participation in decision making; ensure the representativeness, accountability and transparency of social, political and economic structures; play a watchdog role on the State; respond to demands and expectations of communities which the state and business cannot or will not meet; and create community self-identity and empowerment.

It was these concerns which prompted the drafting of the ANC alliance’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP began life as an attempt by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to ensure that a post-election government did not ignore the concerns of organised labour. This concern was soon adopted by social movements within the alliance who saw the RDP as a means of binding a universal franchise government not only to the social programmes which they favoured but also to providing a place for civil society in the

\(^1\) This argument is developed in Friedman (forthcoming).
new order. While the RDP ‘base document’ (ANC, 1994) which emerged was the result of elaborate negotiation and compromise within the ANC alliance, it does contain many references to the ‘empowerment’ of civil society: ‘Democracy for ordinary citizens must not end with formal rights and periodic ... elections ... Without undermining the authority and responsibilities of elected representative bodies ... the democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society... and facilitate direct democracy’.

In keeping with the concern to guarantee civil society’s role, the document proposes the use of ‘sectoral forums... people’s forums, referenda ... and other consultation processes’ (ANC, 1994: 120–1). This not only demonstrates the concerns noted here, but appears to commit the majority party in government to supplementing democratic institutions with civil society forums.

Post-election civil society

The election of a majority government has, perhaps inevitably, disturbed this apparent consensus between ‘civil society’ and the majority party. But it has changed less than it might seem.

At first glance, the tensions appear acute. In the months after the election, cracks in the alliance between the ANC and COSATU were the subject of much Press reportage and public comment. Tensions between SANCO and the ANC, while less publicised, have been perhaps even more marked. They have centred most notably on the division of seats in transitional local governments, and have prompted not only threats by SANCO to re-evaluate its support for the ANC, but also a gun battle between supporters of the two organisations in the North Cape town of Colesberg (Sunday Times, 18 December 1994). Among some commentators, it has become almost a cliché to observe that alliances which held against a common enemy fragment once that foe is no more. For our purposes, this could mean that enthusiasm for civil society, while a useful stratagem during the ANC’s fight for power, has become dispensable now that the ANC has gained power. But these analyses are simplistic, for several reasons.

Firstly, the tensions predate the election: this is evident not only in COSATU’s much publicised difference with the ANC over the entrenchment in the constitution of the right to lock out workers (Atkinson in Friedman and Atkinson, 1994: 140–1) but, more importantly for our purposes, in tensions between the two over the unions’ role in post-election decision making2. More generally, this latter tension illustrated a wider ANC concern to limit the role of civil society forums in social and economic policy making3. It is worth recalling that, despite these differences, the ANC and its civil society partners remained allies during the election campaign and that the alliance seems likely to endure through local elections.

Secondly, the divide between ANC politicians seeking to preserve the role of elected government and social movement

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2 See, for example, speech by then ANC economic policy head Trevor Manuel to SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union conference (Business Day, 21 June 1993).
3 See Manuel’s comments and then ANC education head John Samuel’s remarks on the National Education and Training Forum (Business Day, 28 January 1994).
activists seeking to subordinate it to civil society forums has narrowed as the transition of the early 1990s has progressed. In 1990, it was still possible to hear activists insist that there was no need for local elections because civics already constituted a democratic form of local government° or that local councils ought to submit all decisions to ‘people’s assemblies’°. As these arguments were submitted to scrutiny and debate, and as the prospect of power in formal institutions neared, so many of these arguments were modified. The final RDP draft, with its caveats that formal representative institutions should not be undermined, illustrates this.

Thirdly, pre-election enthusiasm for incorporating civil society in formal decision-making institutions has not disappeared with the ANC’s entry into government. The clearest expression of this is the establishment of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), which consists of four chambers dealing with monetary and fiscal policy, trade and industry, labour, and development. The first three comprise representatives of government and of the two most organised private interests, business and labour; the fourth will include ‘community organisations’. Although Nedlac is formally an advisory body only, it does have statutory status and the presence of the government opens up the prospect that its agreements will be enacted into law. Nedlac therefore seems likely to become one channel through which the RDP

document’s promise of civil society’s ‘empowerment’ will be realised.

Nor are plans for incorporation of civil society restricted to Nedlac. The national RDP office and its Gauteng equivalent are, for example, concerned to promote the establishment of Local Development Forums (LDFs). A document prepared by the Gauteng RDP Commission recommends that LDFs become representative structures: member organisations would have to prove ‘a certain membership’, ‘provide a list of activities’ and submit proof to the LDF of ‘continuous representation’ every six months. The commission also hopes to encourage the formation of subregional forums, under the umbrella of the PWV Economic and Development Forum, which are meant to provide a ‘link between provincial and local government’. Commission documents see these forums as coordinators of development activity and say that forums will link with metropolitan government where possible (Gauteng RDP Commission, unpublished). There is also talk within the new government of local ‘RDP committees’ and of similar institutions to deal with water supply.

There are also hints of plans to incorporate civil society in functions usually associated with the state. The RDP office is considering a role for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in development delivery. One analyst suggests that a plan to deploy state development funds by issuing ‘development vouchers’ to ‘communities’ who will then choose projects and employ implementing agencies (thus rendering NGOs accountable to the communities who employ them) is under consideration.

° These views were for example expressed by civic activists at a Centre for Policy Studies conference on the future of the cities held in 1990.
° A resolution supporting these assemblies was adopted at an ANC local government conference in October 1990. (For an explanation of the proposal see Botha, 1992.)

° See article by Tony Harding in Business Day, 1 September 1994.
The impression that a deep chasm has opened between the ANC in government and its erstwhile partners in civil society is therefore grossly oversimplified. Inevitably, clear differences have emerged which were partly hidden by the anti-apartheid alliance. It is conceivable that these will grow and that civil society may consequently enjoy a far less significant role in government institutions than its advocates hope. For the present, however, Nedlac’s composition and the search for forums to drive or at least influence development suggests that the tensions are about the extent and form of civil society participation in government decisions, not over the principle.

This raises the need to examine this trend and to enquire into its effects on democracy. Are we moving towards an enrichment of representative institutions or their subversion? And, more specifically, is an interest in incorporating civil society in development decisions likely to increase the prospect of democratic and effective development or abridge it?

Civil society: Why and who?

These questions cannot be answered without some reflection on the nature and purpose of civil society.

While this is not the place to review the debate on this issue, we can regard civil society as ‘a public realm of private individual association’ (Reitzes, 1994: 100) or as ‘organisations that are autonomous from the state but interrelate with it[;] ... associations that interact with the state but don’t want to take it over’ (Chazan, 1993: 14). Its existence is a necessary feature of democratic societies since it provides a vehicle for citizens’ participation in public life and a check on the exercise of state power: one of its prime purposes is therefore to ‘civilise’ the democratic state. However, civil society also buttresses that state by binding the citizenry to the rules of democratic politics and so ‘civilising’ private associational activity. Precisely because they are concerned to hold the state to account but not to take it over, civil society institutions integrate the citizenry into the norms of democratic life: ‘an antagonistic relation of civil society, or its actors, to the economy or state arises only when ... the institutions of economic and political society serve to insulate decision making ... from the influence of social organisations, initiatives, and forms of public discussion’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: x–xi).

This calls into question the identification of civics and other sections of the ‘liberation’ movement with ‘civil society’ since these movements were indeed part of a bloc which sought to take over the state. Their formal incorporation in state decision making therefore raises a host of problems.

The first is that, if they are best viewed as adjuncts of the liberation alliance, incorporating them into government decision making is not to include civil society but to give the election winner two bites at the representational cherry: the control of representative institutions through public election and through official selection. At best, such an arrangement would simply formalise a change of power in which one set of interests with the favoured ear of the governing party has been replaced by another; at worst, it would insulate government from the full range of interest associations in society by placing between them and it an artificially selected
civil society which would prevent the citizenry from approaching the government.

It should also be noted here that the dividing line between some elements of civil society and the state with which they wish to interact has become exceedingly thin. Many of the most articulate and talented leaders of these social movements have been absorbed into the post-apartheid state; others may merely be waiting their turn – SANCO’s ex-president found himself demanding a say on behalf of civil society one day and joining the state as an MP the next (Business Day, 25 January 1995). SANCO itself, as noted above, sees itself as a watchdog on local government at the same time as it argues with the ANC about how many of its activists are to become members of the government over which it wants to watch (see, for example, Sowetan, 23 January 1995 and 26 January 1995).

There is a danger that the argument over the respective roles of elected representatives and civil society is really about how the spoils of the acquisition of state power are to be divided.

Another is that, if civil society is indeed to be civil, some preconditions must be met: an inclusive formal/legal constitutional framework; inclusive legal citizenship; a culture of rights and duties; inclusive representative democracy; a culture of political tolerance; formal legal equality of all individuals; and a legitimate government and state. During the apartheid years, none of these preconditions existed, and so many institutions which were identified as ‘organs of civil society’ were misidentified. Their purpose was not to participate in a democratic polity, but to fight against an undemocratic one: the rules of ‘struggle’, not those of democratic citizenship, guided their work.

According to some critics, in South Africa this had consequences which were neither civil nor democratic. ‘... ANC–SACP approval was given to those who flew its flag, ‘enemies of the people’ were targeted, and ‘unity’ was turned into a demand for political conformity ... the central problem was that the unity of the “people” tended to be conceived in terms of an abstract and monolithic “general will”, discounting the actual and divergent empirical wills of its constituent members. The “people” tended to be conceived as a singular interest or will which was embodied in a single movement ... there was a tendency for “unity” to be imposed from above in a fashion that was destined to increase fragmentation on the ground’ (Fine, 1992: 25).

In other words, the dictates of ‘struggle’ in a polarised society prompted the resistance movement, of which civil society social movements were a part, to claim and demand a uniformity which did not exist in society and which contradicts the very notion of civil society, one of whose premises is a diversity of interests, values and associations. Civics, youth congresses and the like became not the vehicles of some people (of even very many people) but of the people. This explains the tendency among resistance organisations to equate the social movements allied to them with the whole of civil society rather than with a part of it.

But, while the apartheid state may not have provided civil society with the preconditions to become ‘civil’, it was not totalitarian – it did not destroy all forms of independent associational life – and so there existed during its reign organisations which were indeed independent of it and which might and did have reason to interact with it. Narsoo makes a helpful distinction between popular ‘organisations of survival’
and ‘organisations of resistance’ among the disenfranchised. The former ‘were the burial clubs, stokvels ... hawker associations, and even football clubs. Their basic project was to survive the rigours of apartheid and to provide some sustenance collectively’ (Narsoo, 1991: 27). To this may be added institutions such as churches, whose membership comprised both the enfranchised and disenfranchised, and voluntary associations within ‘white’ society, from powerful business associations through to special interest groups which sought to influence state policy on specific issues. If, therefore, plans to incorporate ‘civil society’ in state decision making are to exclude these organisations, we are again likely to see not an ‘empowerment’ of civil society, but the insulation of large parts of it from political institutions.

Finally, the genesis of civil society in the context of a struggle for hegemony between two contending blocs necessitates a re-examination of the vehicles whereby civil society was incorporated into state decision making during the transition period and which have, according to the RDP document, become models for their post-apartheid incorporation: forums.

These multi-interest negotiation vehicles, spanning a range of sectors and levels of government, varied in their inclusiveness and their representativeness of the full range of interests in the society. But, with some notable exceptions, it is questionable whether they were primarily intended as vehicles for interaction between private interests and the state. They arose at a time when the liberation movement and its allies were concerned to prevent an undemocratic state, which was a party to the negotiation process, from unilateral decision making designed to give it an unfair advantage in negotiations, either by introducing changes for which it could claim credit or by creating realities which an elected government would be unable to undo. They were therefore not only creatures of the transition (see Shubane and Shaw, 1993), but products of the contest for state power. This explains why they existed at least as much to prevent state decisions as to influence them. While this does not automatically argue against their utility in a post-apartheid order it at least necessitates consideration of whether institutions which aimed to serve one purpose under particular conditions can serve another under different ones.

This raises another consideration which has been implicit in this discussion but which needs now to be made explicit: the extent to which the election of a representative government has altered the parameters of the civil society debate.

Ignoring democracy: The political sphere

The establishment of a constitutional democracy has created some of the necessary conditions for the emergence of a strong and ‘civilising’ civil society.

To be sure, only the necessary conditions, not the sufficient ones, now exist: much work must still be done to realise the utopia of civil society. This will include the creation of a democratic culture of rights; the induction of the citizenry into democratic discourses and practices; the creation of mutuality, reciprocity and political tolerance; and a normative consensus. But it should be self-evident that these conditions cannot be legislated. At best, the formal requirements for the
possibility of their existence can be legislated and, to a certain extent, materially provided. The question, of course, is how?

On the one hand, the RDP document is correct to insist that the holding of elections does not in itself ensure a democracy. By voting, citizens do little more than indicate who they wish to rule. Party support also does not necessarily indicate a preference for particular policies in any more than a very general way. This stems from the reality that any party wishing to govern in a competitive democracy is obliged to present to the electorate a package of policies.

Inevitably, voters who support that party will do so because they support most, but not all, of those policies — witness, for example, survey evidence that most ANC voters disagree with the party’s policy on capital punishment. These points are particularly salient in this society, where parties tend to attract support on the basis of symbolic appeal. A mandate conferred every five years does not give representatives unlimited latitude since conditions and public attitudes may change within the five years. These points argue for a continued role by the citizenry in politics between elections.

But, on the other, representative democracy offers some advantages which civil society does not. The most obvious and important is that representativeness and accountability to the citizenry is a precondition for participation in government, but not in civil society. This is not to contradict the point made in the preceding paragraph. It is, rather, to point out that, however conditional their mandate, public representatives can only acquire that status if they win a measurable slice of voter support and that they will lose that status if, at the next election, they lose that support. Precisely because civil society is a realm of voluntary association and of diversity, its elements do not have to be representative of, or accountable to, the citizenry. (To belabour the point, citizenship confers on everyone the right to vote against and to make claims on public representatives: it does not automatically confer the right to do the same to the leaders of trade unions, business associations or civics unless one chooses to belong to any of these).

This means that a crucial element now exists which was absent under apartheid and which has not been fully recognised by some advocates of a guaranteed, formalised, role for civil society in government: the reality that state decisions are now formally taken by elected representatives who represent political parties which compete for support among the entire electorate.

The absence of such a reality under apartheid explains why the relationship between civil society and the state is often conceived of as that between the citizenry and the bureaucracy. This was indeed the case until last April; formal ‘political society’, the realm in which competitors for political power compete for public support, was closed to 80 per cent of society. Now it is formally open to all and it is open to question whether democracy can survive, or even be said to exist, if this sphere is not the primary vehicle by which citizens indicate their preferences to public representatives.

Given that ‘[t]he political role of civil society ... is the generation of influence through the life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: ix–x), the target of such influence should not be the state itself, but political society, partly constituted of political parties and parliament. ‘Between civil society and the state there has to be some general form of
mediation, for if each particular interest of civil society lobbies the state on behalf of its own private concerns - no matter how justified - then judgement of their claims and determination of priorities between them are left in the hands of one body alone, the state executive. [It] is in principle the representation of the state interest in civil society; the party system is in principle the representation of the private interests of civil society in the state. If the state executive is not to be the sole mediation between state and civil society, then the party system of representation is essential' (Fine, 1992: 30-1).

In other words, the guaranteed incorporation of civil society in the state through forums and the like runs two risks. The first is that it allows interests and organisations which have not submitted themselves to the test of public election to exert as much power as, if not more than, representatives who have. The second is that it may bypass and short-circuit the political system, in that public demands are placed not at the door of political parties and representatives in parliament, but directly at the door of state officials who are meant to be subordinate to these representatives.

None of this assumes that either the party system or parliament is automatically responsive to public opinion. Indeed, our current system of election, closed list proportional representation, is highly unresponsive since representatives are accountable to their party leaderships rather than the electorate. And, while the current parliament has attempted to turn the clandestine standing committee system into a means both of eliciting public responses and of holding bureaucrats and ministers to account, complaints from some committee chairs question whether this system is operating as well in practice as it seems to do in theory.

But this suggests that the route to more effective participation by the full range of civil society associations in the affairs of government lies not so much in the establishment of vast networks of forums as in parliamentary and electoral reform. This topic is hardly mentioned by our local civil society theorists, but is one which so concerns one of their British counterparts, John Keane, that he devoted a chapter of his Democracy and Civil Society to an analysis of 'Dictatorship and the Decline of Parliament' (1988: 153-90).

In sum, the strength and health of civil society depends on that of the democratic state. It is the latter which provides civil society with the liberties, the public order, the material conditions and the access to public decision making without which it would collapse or be subordinated. In the face of a coercive state, institutions of civil society can lose their autonomy and be appropriated by the state, serving merely as conveyor belts for unrepresentative state policy (Narsoo, 1991: 24). Furthermore, the state can use the concept to legitimate its actions and claim a public support which may not exist.

More specifically, our history of polarisation raises the prospect that the post-apartheid state, despite its democratic trappings, will become a vehicle for former constituents of hegemonic blocs, informed by a totalising and adversarial legacy, unable or unwilling to tolerate and nurture a diverse, plural society. In that event, civil society will collapse. If democracy is a

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7 Sisulu, M (Chair of Parliamentary RDP committee), reported in Business Day, 16 November 1994.
necessary condition for vigorous civil society, it is not only society which has to be civilised and democratised, but the state itself. The route to a stronger civil society may therefore lie in opening the state to the widest possible public influence through reforms which maximise its accessibility to all, rather than to those able to gain admittance to state-sanctioned vehicles for civil society participation.

This argument raises an important and uncomfortable question. While the possibility of access to state decisions has been opened in our society, the capacity to use it has not. Pluralist theory, which sees formal democracy as a system in which all interests, views and institutions have an equal opportunity to influence public opinion and therefore decision making (see Dahl, 1961), tends to ignore the reality that some citizens have far greater capacity to do this than others. In our society, this is a particularly acute problem. The ability to participate is shaped not only by differential access, much of it a deliberate legacy of apartheid, to resources such as formal education or the leisure time and funds needed to organise, but also by a factor as basic as language – our public debate is not conducted in the languages spoken by the vast majority of our citizens. Simply leaving democracy to the market-place of competing ideas and organisations may well ensure that the voices which most need to be heard remain stilled.

It is difficult to see how the remedies currently offered in the RDP document or by government offices appointed to implement it address that problem. However well-meaning and meticulous the process of selecting participants in public forums and similar vehicles, these are bound to become channels for those who would in any case be heard under conditions of unrestrained pluralism. If the problem is one of a differential capacity to organise, it cannot be solved by finding new representational channels for the organised.

**Bureaucratising civil society: Corporatism and its limits**

To point out that democratic states give all extra-parliamentary groups the framework for incorporation into civil society, enabling them to make claims on the state, does not necessarily mean that these states rely only on the parliamentary system and pluralist rules for their dealings with private interests.

On the contrary, a look at industrial democracies shows that most establish arrangements which allow strong, organised, private interests guaranteed access to the state. These arrangements, labelled 'democratic corporatism', not only coexist with democracy but are held by many analysts to be essential to it since they commit organised interests, whose consent is essential to the functioning of democracy, to adhere to the policies enacted by democratic government in exchange for the right to negotiate those policies. Can these arrangements not be said to be the inspiration for forums such as Nedlac and those proposed by the RDP offices?

An answer lies in understanding why corporatist arrangements have emerged and who participates in them. Their purpose is not to 'empower civil society' but to formalise the participation of interests who already have power and whose demands the state needs to incorporate if it is to govern effectively. Although democratic
corporatism is invariably initiated by the state (see Cawson, 1986), it is, after all, the only agent with the formal power to establish a statutory institution. It does this as a response to existing power relations, not in an attempt to create new ones. This is why it is common for the state to formalise a corporatist arrangement only after strong private interests have begun to do this themselves.

Because the chief aim of the exercise is effective government rather than popular empowerment it is essential to successful corporatist arrangements that the parties be able to bind their constituents to negotiated agreements. If they are not, the government — and, for that matter, their other negotiation partners — might as well leave policy making to the pluralist market-place. For a variety of reasons, international experience shows very clearly that producer interests command the power to do this, but consumer interests do not (Cawson, 1986). Business organisations, trade unions and professional associations tend to be candidates for corporatism, rather than tenant coalitions, consumer unions or parent associations. It is not hard to see why a teachers’ or doctors’ association, whose members can withdraw their labour, organises more tightly than patients or parents, whose last resort is to take their custom elsewhere or do without the service; or why employers workers organise more formally than shoppers or the homeless.

It is these considerations which gave birth to the National Economic Forum, to the reconstituted National Manpower Commission and its current offspring, Nedlac. While there is an important and lively debate on the extent to which either business or labour in this country is equipped for corporatism, there is no doubt that both are strong producer interests, with definable constituencies who pay dues to their employer association or trade union; that both are organised; and that they have at least the potential to bind crucial constituencies to negotiated agreements. Nedlac also formalises an existing bargaining relationship which produced an agreement on new labour legislation during the 1980s. Whatever its fate, three of its chambers represent an attempt to introduce a mode of interaction between the state and strong private interests with a proven ability to coexist with democratic institutions and to enhance industrial efficiency and equity.

The same cannot be said of the decision to establish a development chamber which will include community organisations who can show that they ‘represent a community interest at national level’; have a direct interest in the RDP; and are democratically constituted and able to seek mandates, a measure which has been widely interpreted as a means of guaranteeing representation to SANCO. The members of this chamber are unlikely to be able to bind members to decisions — many do not recruit members and SANCO has been manifestly unable to end, even at times to initiate, the boycotts which are its chief mobilising tool. Both their representativeness and their ability to bind constituents are untested and it is therefore unclear why their inclusion is held to increase the prospect of obtaining social consensus for policy. On the contrary, it may well weaken the forum’s ability to function by adding to the number of organisations from whom agreement must

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8 Calls by SANCO on township residents to resume payments were largely ignored: in November 1994 its then PWV region resolved to collect money to meet the shortfall caused by non-payment, a tacit acknowledgement that it could not persuade non-payers to pay (Sowetan, 2 November 1994).
be sought, but not to the number able to bind important parts of the society to those agreements.

It is possible that the fourth chamber is an attempt by the majority party to strengthen the non-business side of the Nedlac table. If it is, it is unclear what this is meant to achieve: an elected government does not require a corporatist forum to impose laws on business. It needs to secure the voluntary consent of business, and weighting the bargaining table is unlikely to do this. The assumption by some on the left that ‘empowering civil society’ is a short cut to desired outcomes which cannot be achieved through the representative system because powerful conservative forces exist to obstruct them seems to ignore the reality that it is not possible to address this problem through the civil society ‘back door’ since civil society ‘... comprises all organisations which are not part of the coercive apparatuses of the state. It is a terrain which includes not only social movements, but also...capital. Civil society is not, therefore, in itself ‘progressive’ – it is a terrain of contest between conflicting ‘progressive’ and conservative forces which fight for control and influence within it ...

If one does not recognise that all these forces are part of civil society, one does not understand the relations of power in this realm. Those ... who ignore the presence of conservative interests in civil society allow their powerful role to be disguised’ (Narsoo, 1992: 5).

Given that one persistent criticism of Nedlac is that it excludes the unemployed, the rural dwellers and other marginalised groups, it is more likely that the fourth chamber is designed to incorporate these constituencies in the corporatist fold. This reasoning is flawed, for two reasons. Firstly, because the representativeness of community organisations is untested and because it is by definition implausible that any organisation represents those unable to organise, this measure cannot transform Nedlac into a fully representative institution. Secondly, the reasoning seems based on the fallacy that those who are not included in state-engineered institutions are necessarily denied a say. This is to misconceive the nature of civil society and the democratic state, and the relation between the two. Civil society exists precisely to represent the plurality of interests within society; to perform a watchdog role on the state; and to give a voice to those who wish the state to take cognisance of their needs. As the ideal of direct democracy is not realisable in practice, modern states give their citizenry a voice through representative democracy and civil society.

Critics of corporatist institutions tend to forget that they have three parties and that one of these is the democratic state which remains subject to the same electoral pressures it faces when there is no corporatism. Community groups which do not believe that corporatist agreements reflect their constituency’s interests are able to seek to thwart these through the standard pluralist tools, from quiet lobbying of government ministers to legal mass demonstrations.

Indeed, there is a strong danger that the incorporation of community groups into Nedlac or other forums will serve not to empower civil society but to bureaucratising it. While community organisations are meant to apply to Nedlac, their applications are subject to approval by a committee chaired by a representative of the RDP office (see The Star, 28 December 1995; Natal Witness, 6 March 1995; Business Day, 8 March 1995). Since the criteria are
subjective (what does ‘a community interest at national level’ mean?), representatives of civil society will, in effect, be chosen by a government official.

Similarly, the Gauteng RDP Commission’s LDF document – which seems to envisage a web of forums leading from the grass roots to the Commission – suggests that the ‘government must be in control of the launch [of the forums]’, and ‘the [ANC] alliance ... must be consulted in the establishment of LDFs’. Any proposed LDF project ‘should be reported to the RDP Commission and the [National Working Committee]’ which ‘makes the assessment and ratifies the project’ (Gauteng RDP Commission, unpublished). Given that the criteria for membership are vague, and it is not clear who would decide whether they are met, there is a danger of government officials choosing the forum’s membership. Rather than recognising the voluntaristic, autonomous, plural, and inclusive nature of the participation of civil society in decision making, these proposals seem to intend to construct civil society from the top down; to coopt it into statist structures, and determine and control the nature and extent of its participation.

Either lip service is being paid to the influence of civil society and its participation is being evoked to legitimate state policy, or this is an attempt to coopt selected organs of civil society and to use them as conveyor belts for the implementation of state decisions, or both. The idea of organs of civil society being managed by the state by definition negates the idea of civil society. Furthermore, such limited participation does not provide opportunities for capacity building and empowerment.

Alternatively, the state is attempting to defer its ultimate policy-making responsibility to institutions which it defines and controls within strictly circumscribed limits.

The paradox which these proposals raise is the spectre of an increasingly coopted and bureaucratised civil society. Far from positing civil society as an alternative to the Weberian nightmare of burgeoning bureaucracy, they raise the possibility of its becoming an administrative arm of the state. Far from democratising society, this may reinforce a tendency already, in the view of some critics, prevalent in industrial societies: ‘The ... exercise and equilibrium of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute its acclamation’ (Calhoun, 1992: 22).

The point of these criticisms is not simply to highlight potential defects in particular documents. It is, rather, to draw attention to an exercise whose assumptions probably lead it inevitably in the direction described here. Democratic corporatism is usually a response to a need to incorporate into the state those decision-making groups which have already demonstrated their representativeness and their organisation. No committee is required to decide whether COSATU or the South African Chamber of Business is sufficiently representative to merit inclusion in Nedlac.

Once the state sets about selecting the representatives of civil society, however, one of two outcomes seems likely. The first — which, to offer the benefit of the doubt, the Gauteng proposals may seek to do —
would seek to avoid the danger of a state-selected civil society by engaging in an elaborate exercise to ensure representativeness and inclusiveness. But why should officials be better than the electorate at determining representativeness? And if many of the likely candidates are groups which do not present themselves for election and who therefore do not seek a mandate from the electorate, why is it considered necessary to incorporate them into state or quasi-state institutions? Alternatively, of course, the candidates may be selected arbitrarily by officials not because they are held to be representative, but because they are seen as politically compatible. In this case, the arrangement is likely to resemble not democratic corporatism, but its authoritarian counterpart, in which civil society is either coopted into the state or created by it and is then used to endow unrepresentative decisions with a spurious aura of public legitimacy (Narsoo, 1991: 27). Thus an unintended consequence of the inclusion of community organisations in Nedlac may be to prevent the representation of the really marginalised by assuming that their interests are already represented by those selected to join the council.

One further consideration suggests scepticism about the extent to which state initiatives of this sort can empower civil society. Even if the civil society institutions selected to participate are fully representative, this does not automatically ensure that they possess the capacity to participate in a formal or quasi-formal state institution. Some theories of popular participation appear to start from the assumption that all human beings, and institutions, have equal capacity in all areas of public policy making. This is clearly false. Just as an individual may be a brilliant social analyst, but untrained in the intricacies of international trade, so too may an organisation be skilled in articulating the demands of hostel dwellers but unschooled in the details of town planning or urban finance. It is these capacity problems which have hampered the role of popular organisations in many of the forums which emerged during the transition.

This is not an argument for the monopolisation of public policy by technically trained élites: on the contrary, it emphasises the need for elected representatives and interest group leaders to ensure that technical proposals are communicated to the electorate or their constituencies in ways which allow them to exercise an informed choice as to whether the plans serve their interests. But it does illustrate that incorporation into forums is not an unmixed blessing for those in civil society ‘fortunate’ enough to be selected: they could well find themselves forced to take joint responsibility for decisions which they were not fully equipped to take.

Similarly, as trade unions discovered after their nascent corporatist experiment began, it takes great effort and care to avoid estrangement from their constituency once they have become caught up in the pressures and technicalities of forum business. The danger may be particularly acute in development forums, where insistence on consulting a constituency can be portrayed by opponents as a lack of seriousness about delivery. There is a possibility that organisations in civil society which did represent a constituency when they entered forums will soon cease to do so because they entered them.

The reality that incorporation into official structures implies constraints as well as opportunities is even more apparent when organisations outside state control are
offered the opportunity to implement official programmes. The concern among some non-governmental organisations that plans to offer them a share of state development funds may subject them to unacceptable controls reflects this (Business Day, 23 August 1994, 24 August 1994). For highly organised interests with secure power bases in the private realm, the trade-off may well hold more benefits than costs -- this is one of the key rationales for democratic corporatism. For the rest, the cost-benefit calculation may point strongly in the opposite direction.

However well-intentioned, therefore, 'inclusive' and 'representative' forums, which stem not from the state's need to formalise dealings with already influential constituencies but from the theories of government planners or the need to claim a representativeness which is unproven, could become a vehicle not for empowering civil society but for shackling it.

Some development implications

The preceding discussion has raised points the applicability of which to development policy and process should be implicit. It is necessary, however, to spell out some specific implications for the development process.

A democratic state needs to provide not only a formalised framework for agents of civil and political society, but also basic services without which civil society cannot function. If one is homeless, starving and uneducated, one's ability to participate in these two realms is severely curtailed. The stated concern of state policy to encourage development among citizens hitherto deprived of it is, therefore, a crucial potential contribution to the development of civil society itself. Indeed, given that many citizens lack the capacity to participate fully in the sort of associational life likely to impact on government policy, development itself is arguably a more substantial contribution to the growth of a strong civil society than attempts to synthesise the latter through the creation of quasi-official institutions.

This is not, however, to say that the elected government, having received its popular mandate, should simply set about developing the society on the assumption that citizens have now identified their development preferences. This paper has already dealt with the normative objections to such an approach: the 62 per cent of the electorate who support the majority party are united in their rejection of minority rule, but they have many competing and conflicting development interests and are not united in their choice of development policies and strategies. Even among public representatives elected on the same party ticket, there is no unanimity on appropriate development strategies, as evidenced by the vigorous debate on housing policy between the ANC-controlled ministry of housing and ANC provincial housing MECs.

There are also severe practical difficulties in any attempt to develop 'from the top down'. Recent development experience has shown all too clearly that the assumption that communities are united in their development preferences may ensure the rejection of particular development projects, the refusal of recipients to pay for them and, in some cases, violent mobilisation against them (Friedman, 1993). The notion of 'community' is in itself questionable, since it describes people who may share a common residential space but not common
development interests and preferences. The complex ‘community’ dynamics which may ensure the success or failure of a development project cannot be discerned by representatives simply because their party has won a majority in a general election.

Local elections may well help to address this, not only because they may allow for the representation of local interests which cannot be adequately expressed in a national poll but because, unlike their national equivalent, they include a degree of direct election by constituents which may ensure that representatives are more accountable to specific sectors of the population. But even then, election will be no guarantee of the ability to discern development preferences, both because geography does not necessarily coincide with interest and because some of the groups most threatened by some development initiatives, such as illegal immigrants or criminal gangs, are, for obvious reasons, unlikely to make their presence, let alone their preferences, known to public representatives.

All this would seem to argue forcibly for the formal incorporation of grass roots civil society in development decision making. A moment’s reflection on the arguments presented here should contradict that. Such a strategy will, by definition, include only the visible, in other words the organised, interests. Not only does this beg the question of how, say, illegal immigrants are to be prevented from mobilising against development by an ‘inclusive’ forum which will inevitably exclude them; it also does not explain how the preferences of the many residents who are not organised are to be discerned by consulting those who are. And, since the interests included in these forums are likely to be those who already have means of voicing their preferences, the exercise may be not only redundant but may serve to further insulate decision makers and the development process from those at the base of society whose interests most need to be heard.

Following on the preceding discussion of corporatism, it could be argued that there are visible organisations within communities which, while they may not represent all interests, particularly the weakest ones, do command the capacity to derail any initiative to which they are not party and that something akin to a local development forum is needed to prevent them doing so: this point was generally, and probably accurately, held to refer to the civics during the 1980s and early 1990s. Three points are relevant here.

The first is that it is at least questionable whether there still are such organisations: certainly, the civics’ capacity to derail development has probably been sharply impaired, not only by the departure of key personnel into government – to name but one example, Gauteng’s MEC for housing now finds himself campaigning against the service charge boycotts and land invasions which the civic movement of which he was a leader once championed (Business Day, 15 February 1994, 24 August 1994) – but also by the reality that the authority against which resistance would have to be mobilised was elected by the civic constituency which activists would galvanise into resistance. The second is that, even if there are such constituencies – and the Gauteng MEC’s experience suggests that they may come increasingly from the right, rather than the left – it is unclear why a forum is needed to consult or include them. The third, which flows from this,
is that the ability to derail development is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for inclusion in a corporatist or quasi-corporatist development forum. As this paper has argued, a sufficient condition is also the ability to bind constituencies to compromises, and the civics’ very limited success in, for example, eliciting payment of service charges, raises serious questions about their ability to do so.

It is worth noting here that there is one interest which does have a notable potential influence on development and whose rule, at first glance, raises some of the issues discussed here: traditional leaders. Like the resistance movements of the 1980s, they insist that the democracy in terms of which they are supposed to be part of the state is incapable of accommodating their concerns. Like sections of the social movements which fought apartheid, they demand a role in governing without submitting themselves to popular election. (Chiefs in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal have not only demanded a say in law-making without submitting themselves to election, but have also rejected local government elections, arguing that traditional law has bestowed on them the right to rule traditional areas without election⁹.) It is perhaps one of the more ironic legacies of our history that the demand for a special form of incorporation in the democratic state is now voiced by groups representing conservative interests (the white right’s demand for a racially exclusive volkstaat is another example) on much the same grounds as those representing ‘progressive’ ones. The recent memory of a period in which groups could make claims based on their deliberate exclusion from the state gives a credibility to these demands which they might lack in a society with a different recent past.

While this example illustrates the point that demands for special forms of representation can emanate from opposite ends of the political spectrum, the analogy with the civil society debate is false. Chiefs are not presenting themselves as an important interest in society which needs a guaranteed right to be heard. They see themselves as an alternative source of state authority. The fate of this claim will depend on the constitutional negotiating process, and the way in which chiefs impact formally on development will in large measure be settled there.

If they are given formal powers, an anomalous situation will exist since persons who have no electoral mandate will enjoy formal powers over the distribution of public resources. If their role prompts dissatisfaction among significant numbers of their subjects, we might again face a situation in which those who seek representation of their interests may have, like the resistance movements of the 1980s, to attempt to take over at least a part of the state rather than to interact with it: the potential beginnings of such a trend may be emerging in the conflict between chiefs and SANCO in the Eastern Cape. It will then become difficult to speak of a relationship between civil society and the state, at least in traditional areas.

If they are not, they could, in some parts of the country, become another interest with the presumed capacity to derail development: but if that occurs, the argument for including them in a formal quasi-corporatist arrangement would rest on shaky ground because they would not, by definition, seek to secure the voluntary consent of constituents to agreements.

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⁹ This has prompted severe tension between the Eastern Cape traditional leaders and SANCO. See for example Eastern Province Herald, 20 January 1995, 7 February 1995, 8 February 1995.
(unless chiefs were to offer themselves for
election, in which case they would cease to
be traditional sources of authority) and their
inclusion could not therefore guarantee that
of all interests in their domain. As with
some other key interests, any development
planner or implementer would have to take
their existence and preferences into account,
but guaranteeing them a formal say would
do as much to exclude affected interests as
to include them.

How then to escape from the apparently
insoluble dilemma that development may be
derailed by unorganised or not visibly
organised interests but that these cannot, by
definition, be included in decision making
by forums? The answer, to the extent that
there is one, lies not in replacing current
formulae for democratic development with
another, more sophisticated, one. Still less
does it lie in replacing forums or similar
vehicles with some other technique for
representing the unrepresented. It lies rather
in acknowledging one of the consequences
of democratisation – that it confers on
elected representatives not only a mandate,
but also a responsibility.

To insist that development dynamics are
complex and that development strategies
may fail if they do not grasp the full range
of interests among beneficiaries and seek to
gain their consent is not to insist that this
problem can be addressed by the
establishment of more formal state
institutions. On the contrary, it could be
argued that the need to establish elaborate
structures for the inclusion of all interests is
articulated only when there are no
accountable public representatives who risk
deploy failure if development plans fail.

Since we now have – or will have, provided
that the necessary political reforms are
made – a political system which allows not
only the presumed beneficiaries of
development, but all those with a stake in it,
hold to account public representatives
who fail to meet citizens’ development
needs, it follows that we should now expect
those representatives, or those they delegate
to act on their behalf, to take responsibility
for implementing development programmes
which do win the voluntary consent of
beneficiaries. It is, after all, not at all clear
why a minister or an MEC or a mayor
should need a government structure to
understand and to respond to his or her
electorate, or to understand the
circumstances under which voters live, in
order to be aware of the existence of groups
which may derail that which his or her
constituents want.

This does not mean that our representative
institutions are necessarily equipped to take
up this task – indeed, two recent pieces of
evidence have shown the extent to which
they are not. The one, seemingly unrelated
to development, is the low response to
appeals to register for local elections: if the
link between parties and voters was as
strong as some hold it to be, we should
expect the latter to flock to registration
tables on being urged by their parties to do
so. The other is a recent Centre for Policy
Studies focus group research project which
found a significant gulf between the
development expectations of grass roots
voters and the expectations which their
public representatives believe them to have
(Charney, 1995). The Centre for Policy
Studies study also found that people at the
grass roots have a more sophisticated
understanding of development constraints
and possibilities than many who speak in
their name.

But the fact that our political system is not
as attuned to the grass roots as it should be
is not to say that it cannot become attuned.
Still less is it to say that it will become attuned through the establishment of forums comprising the elites whose views representatives often hear rather than those of the voters whose preferences they rarely receive. Indeed, it could be argued that establishing these forums will worsen the problem by allowing public representatives to evade it on the grounds that they do not have to understand the grass roots of our society since it is already well represented in a forum.

It is also worth noting that there are parts of our society in which civil society in the sense that the term has been used here does not exist or does so in very attenuated form. Rural residents who participated in the Centre for Policy Studies focus group exercise were asked who in their area was qualified to express their development needs: none mentioned civics or interest associations; the African National Congress or the local chief were usually cited, often after some thought (Charney, 1995). Two points can be made about this. The first is that it illustrates the danger of artificially manufacturing consultation with civil society: the responses gleaned by the study suggest clearly that any civil society organisation selected for consultation would not represent the focus group respondents nor, most likely, many other rural people like them. The second is that those who identified the ANC as their interlocutor are expressing a confidence in elected representation and in the party system which provides both an opportunity and a responsibility to public representatives in their areas.

It could be argued therefore that the weakest interests in our society do not need another network of forums: they need, rather, public representatives willing and able to understand their interests, to mediate between them where they conflict, and to translate technical development plans into understandable options. They need also an institution with the capacity to translate their preferences into uniformly applied policy, and the state is arguably the only institution capable of doing this. They need also the formal power to remove representatives who do not accept responsibility for gauging their preferences and implementing policy which enjoys wide consent.

The beginning of an answer to our development dilemmas, like the genesis of a vigorous and civilising civil society, lies not in synthesising or subverting our formal representative institutions but in invigorating and expanding them.
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